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The causes for the emergence of the narrative on the equal assignment of 
blame and the reasons why this narrative has become dominant in Western 
historiography are ascertained in this work. The fundamental objective is 
to analyse the perspective from which Western European and American 
political and academic circles view the colapse of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia’s role in the events which transpired 
from 1990 to 1995. With some individual exceptions, writers from Europe 
and America have generally taken the stance that the war in the territory of 
Yugoslavia was a civil war. Herein the insistence on the civil nature of the war 
in Croatia is also aimed at proving the equal culpability of all warring sides 
(Croatian and Serbian) for its outbreak. By the same token, it is apparent that 
Western historiography and current affairs analysis makes very little use of 
scholarly works generated by Croatian historiography, which are generally in 
agreement that in 1991 the Republic of Croatia was subject to aggression. The 
standpoints of Western historians and others (so-called “Balkan experts”) do 
not substantially differ from the policies which the United States and the 
European Union implement toward Croatia and the countries of the former 
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Yugoslavia. This points to the conclusion that historical research in the West 
is under the great influence of the views of political elites.
Key words: Homeland War, collapse of the SFRY, Serbian aggression, equal 
blame, Franjo Tuđman
The equal blame narrative between scholarsip and politics
In historical scholarship, as in other academic disciplines, there are para-
digms which are rooted in research, but also on the authority of individual 
scholars or scholarly communities. Thus, with regard to Croatia’s Homeland 
War, two firmly firmly-ensconced narratives, or paradigms, emerged which 
are mutually exclusive. The first, tentatively called the “Croatian narrative,” 
stipulates that in 1991 the political leadership of Serbia and Montenegro at 
the time, with the help of the Yugoslav People’s Army, perpetrated aggression 
against the Republic of Croatia with the objective of conquering a part of Cro-
atian territory. This narrative has been accepted by a great majority of histo-
rians in Croatia, and it received something of a codification in the Croatian 
Parliament’s Declaration on the Homeland War.1
The other narrative is based on the thesis of equal blame. According to this 
narrative, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the conflict in Croatia were equally 
the fault of the Serbian and Croatian sides. The theory of equal blame for the 
war in Croatia is today the dominant narrative at the global level, which a part 
of the academic community is attempting to transform into a dogmatic truth. 
The adherents of this theory are diverse; among them one may find those who 
do not want to acknowledge the fact that Serbian aggression was perpetrated 
against Croatia in 1991, those who believed in the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as a socialist multi-ethnic utopia, as well as those who 
opportunistically uphold any predominant paradigm.
A crucial influence in the creation of the dominant narrative on the equal 
apportionment of blame between the Croatian and Serbian sides in the Home-
land War was exerted by the global great powers, especially the United States 
and the major countries of Western Europe. From the very outbreak of the 
conflicts in Yugoslavia, American and European policies had two common 
goals: halt the war and reinforce their own political influence in the Balkans. 
Thus, the severe sanctioning of Serbia for the wars it was waging in Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo would not have been opportune, be-
cause it would have permanently threatened its incorporation into Euro-At-
lantic integration. So the narrative of Serbia’s aggression against Croatia would 
have been inimical to American and European interests, while the narrative 
1 This declaration does not bind the academic community, however, which means that histori-
ans in Croatia are free to adopt other views on the character of the Homeland War. “Deklaracija 
o Domovinskom ratu”, Narodne novine, no. 102/2000.
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on equal blame was an ideal platform for the future political stabilization and 
reintegration of an area that was later called the “Western Balkans”. The great 
Western powers had strong instruments with which to impose any histori-
cal narrative and which they indeed used to make the equal blame narrative 
dominant. This could be implemented by means of conferring scholarships, 
organizing scholarly conferences, financing research, and providing support 
to the work of select non-governmental organizations in Croatia which advo-
cated equal blame. This immense system placed a dilemma before many Croa-
tian historians as to whether they should be guided by their consciences and 
scholarly principles or opportunistically accept the dominant narrative. Some 
of them could not resist the great benefits involved.
Roots of the equal blame thesis
In his famed novel 1984, George Orwell wrote that whoever controls the 
past controls the future, and whoever controls the present controls the past. 
His potent words quite convincingly illustrate the position of Croatian histori-
ography today to an unbelievable degree, but also explain its meandering path 
over the course of past centuries. Above all, it should be emphasized that until 
the 1990s, Croatia was generally perceived in Western historiographies in the 
manner in which it was presented by Yugoslav and, in the 1945-1990 period, 
communist historiography, full of prejudices and outright historiographic de-
ceptions. Western historiographies only took from Yugoslav historiography 
what suited them from the vantage point of the “big” looking down upon the 
“small.” This is why a major struggle was waged in the field of historiography in 
the 1990s to dispel the myth of the alleged 700,000 Serbs killed in the Ustasha 
concentration camp at Jasenovac, and Croatian historians did much to illu-
minate the truth about Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac who, under the influence of 
Serbian and Croatian communist historiography, was seen as a butcher almost 
equal to Ante Pavelić in the eyes of many Western historians.2 This attitude of 
the West toward earlier Croatian history did not auger well with regard to the 
Homeland War, either.
2 Today, it is generally accepted that the alleged 700,000 Serbs killed in Jasenovac was a myth 
intended to compromise the entire Croatian nation. This myth has been harmful in many ways. 
Besides serving as one of the primary sources for inciting hatred of the Serbs against Croats, it 
brought into question the entire narrative of the antifascist struggle in Croatia. The well-argued 
proofs provided by many Croatian historians that 700,000 constitutes a vastly exaggerated figure 
for the actual victims of the Jasenovac camp put many global Holocaust research centres in an 
unpleasant position. In its entry on Jasenovac, The Holocaust Encyclopedia entry on Jasenovac 
states that the estimated number of victims ranges from 100,000 to 700,000, which shows that 
the editor took into account the Croatian standpoint, but nonetheless encountered difficulty in 
striking out the previously generally accepted Serbian claim. Walter Laquer, ed., The Holocaust 
Encyclopedia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 346.
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In line with the aforementioned reasons for the creation of the equal blame 
narrative, it is vital to keep in mind the words of Margaret Thatcher, the former 
prime minister of Great Britain, who in her memoirs in 2002 ascertained that 
Western leaders made three crucial mistakes during the collapse of communist 
Yugoslavia. On this, Thatcher wrote:
“First, they tried to keep Yugoslavia together when it was clearly no longer 
possible to do so. This gave the Yugoslav army the impression that there would 
be no outside opposition to its trying to suppress the separatists by force. Sec-
ond, the international community imposed an arms embargo on all the com-
ponent parts of the former Yugoslavia. This deprived the Slovenes, Croats and 
Bosnians of the means to defend themselves and left them heavily outgunned 
by the aggressor. Third, the attempt at even-handedness in assessing blame for 
what was occurring, when the truth was that one side was the aggressor and 
the other the victim, led the West into something approaching complicity with 
the crimes being committed.”3
Thatcher vehemently opposed the policy of equal blame, because she 
rightly believed that it led to even greater suffering of people and that it did not 
help resolve the conflict between the warring sides. On the role of Europe in 
the events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, she concluded: “Far from 
being ‘the hour of Europe’, as Jacques Poos (the then Foreign Minister of Lux-
embourg) proclaimed, it was the hour of Europe’s shame.”4
Thatcher’s conclusions fully elucidate the intentions of the Western pow-
ers and the reasons why the equal blame narrative became dominant in the 
historiography of Western countries. Nonetheless, besides political attitudes, 
there were also numerous prejudices which dovetailed with this narrative. 
For example, many Western historians, believing that Croatian and Serbian 
academic circles adopted mutually exclusive, extreme nationalistic positions, 
wanted to assume the role of impartial and objective third parties. However, 
their works have shown that most of these Western ‘Balkan experts’ were not 
up to the task they set for themselves. First, most of them were not very well 
informed of circumstances in Yugoslavia, and they were usually influenced 
by Balkan associates (friends, colleagues) who suggested viewpoints and the 
sources and references they should consult. Second, they were victims of their 
own prejudices. In the belief that both conflicting sides (Croatian and Serbian) 
were excessively underscoring their own victimhood and the guilt of others, 
may of the Western ‘Balkan experts’ concluded that the truth about the war in 
Croatia lay somewhere in the middle, and they thus created the narrative of 
equal blame. Naturally, this stance by Western academic circles suited the Ser-
bian side, because it wiped away the obvious guilt for the aggression in Croatia 
3 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft, Strategies for a Changing World (London: HarperCollins Pub-
lishers, 2002), 298-299.
4 Ibid., 299.
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and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while it deprived the Croatian side (already weaker 
and internationally isolated) of its status of a victim.
Besides political interests and prejudices, one of the root causes of the cre-
ation of the equal blame narrative could also be found in the general convic-
tion held in Western political and academic circles that Yugoslavia was an ideal 
framework for the political life of the South Slav peoples. Herein they were 
either unaware or unwilling to consider the internal problems that plagued 
both the first (monarchical) and second (communist) Yugoslavia. This is why 
Croatian and Slovenian separatism was so carelessly highlighted, implicitly 
placing responsibility for the conflict on those two republics, while Serbian 
hegemonic aspirations were never seriously considered until the outbreak of 
armed conflict and the perpetration of the first major war crimes by Serbian 
armed forces. The heart of the problem was in fact the Western view that the 
multiethnic Yugoslavia was an ideal solution to the area of the “western Bal-
kans”. Thus, all they saw in the collapse of Yugoslavia from 1991 through 1995 
was a conflict between the forces struggling to preserve the multiethnic Yugo-
slavia and separatists and nationalists driven by the “backward-looking” spirit 
of creating ethnic states. Even when the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina (1992-1995), Western countries, including their academic communities, 
maintained the stance that this state could not be allowed to fall apart (even 
though it was actually partitioned under the Dayton Accords), because to the 
West it represented the final chance to maintain coexistence and multiethnic-
ity, and perhaps even form the core of some new Yugoslavia (Western Balkans, 
Yugosphere). Even though Western academic circles were not unanimous 
(there were, and still are, at least two different factions: the pro-Bosniak and 
pro-Serbian), they nonetheless agreed that the Croatian side also shared the 
blame for both the war in Croatia and the later war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Croatia as an example of an unwanted ethnic nation
The idealization of multiethnic nations and, hand-in-hand with this, the 
disparagement of ethnic nations, have a broader theoretical foundation. For 
over a half-century, great debates on the past, present and future of national 
identities have been conducted in the historiographies of the West. Although 
the scholarly works on nations and nationalism always stress that there are 
two opposing scholarly standpoints on this theme – the essentialist and con-
structivist – based on the number and preferences exhibited in various works, 
it may be concluded that currently the essentialist side is almost without a 
serious advocate in Western historiography. In other words, the vast majority 
of scholars in the West believe that national identities are imagined communi-
ties and negate that they have any positive value. When justifying this negative 
stance on national identities, Western historians most of cite the works of Eric 
Hobsbawm, the recently deceased British historian with a Marxist orientation, 
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and Ernest Gellner, a typical representative of contemporary liberal thought, 
which has transitioned entirely from left-oriented national corporatism to civ-
ic individualism. However, there is nonetheless a differentia specifica in their 
assessments of various nations, which classifies Western nations more progres-
sive and democratic when compared to Eastern (Eastern European) nations. 
Hobsbawm, namely, differentiated between “nations […] based on ethnicity, 
language or common history” and “liberal nation-making”.5 This is actually an 
old concept which acquired a new social role in recent decades.
Already at the onset of the twentieth century, German historian Friedrich 
Meinecke divided nations in the political nations (Staatsnation) and cultural 
nations (Kulturnation), and this same division was assumed in 1944 by British 
historian Hans Kohn. According to this division, Western nations (Western 
European, but also the United States) were political nations based on a tradi-
tion of statehood, while Eastern (Eastern European) nations were created on 
the basis of common cultures. The core of this division is a distinction between 
the Western, civic type  and the Eastern, ethno-cultural type of nation which 
was only rejuvenated in Hobsbawm’s writings. Thus, according to this division, 
Western nations are based on the civil/liberal principle, while ethnic nations 
are based on ethnicity (“the counting of blood cells” as one may often hear to-
day) and that is why Hobsbawm and like-thinkers see them as the true source 
of nationalism, chauvinism and everything negative, which is why left-liberal 
circles have such a dim view of national identities. From this, it not difficult to 
come to the conclusion that these same circles see Western nations as civic and 
progressive, and Eastern nations as ethnocentric, xenophobic and backward.
Hobsbawm’s view is today predominant in all Western academic com-
munities. It was from this perspective that Western academic circles viewed 
the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, something entirely different 
could be read from this division imposed by the Western academic communi-
ty as a general paradigm for national identities. Such a division of nations is an 
indicator of a typical colonial approach by the great imperialist countries to the 
smaller countries that were always the objects of their imperialist aspirations. 
It is actually a typical example of the attitude of the core toward the periphery, 
the West toward the East, Europe toward the Balkans (Orient). And this is ap-
parent from Hobsbawm’s writings on the Croatian nation.
In his book Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Hobsbawm in fact men-
tions the Croatian nation as an example of a typical ethnic nation. In his as-
sessment of the emergence of the Croatian nation, he cites the works of Croa-
tian historian Mirjana Gross, and based on her research he concluded that 
Croatian nationalism “mirrored the opposition of the petite bourgeoisie to Yu-
goslavism as an ideology of the wealthier bourgeoisie”.6 Hobsbawm’s assump-
5 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Canto, 1991), p. 33.
6 Ibid., 120.
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tion of Mirjana Gross’ conclusion on the foundations of the Croatian nation 
is perhaps the best illustration of the West’s stance toward the East, which is 
why the Homeland War is often portrayed as a tribal conflict or least a conflict 
between nations at a lower level of social development. Hobsbawm obviously 
wanted to show that the ideology of the wealthier bourgeoisie had already be-
come predominant in Europe’s west in the nineteenth century, opening the 
way for a multicultural civil society, while at the same time the petit-bourgeois 
concept of ethnic identities, focused on the creation of small ethno-national 
states, was predominant in the East. The sole exception in the Balkans, ac-
cording to Hobsbawm, was the Yugoslav idea, which was a multiethnic idea 
of the wealthier bourgeoisie aimed at overcoming petit-bourgeois identities. 
It is astonishing that Hobsbawm, as one of the best known Marxist historians, 
did not see that with this interpretation, he had adopted the stance of a typi-
cal proponent of the British colonial approach toward the Balkan nations. For 
it is clear that the Western European type of multiethnic nation emerged as a 
result of the imperial policies of Western European elites and that multiethnic 
democracy is an ideal that has been promoted in Western Europe for perhaps a 
little more than a half century. On the contrary, Hobsbawm was convinced that 
his interpretation of the Croatian nation as the identity of the xenophobic and 
backward petite bourgeoisie served as a defence of his Marxist standpoints.
The consequences of such a stance toward the small nations of south-east-
ern Europe are very deep and painful. Among other things, such a view led to 
an a priori condemnation of the Croatian struggle for freedom and indepen-
dence in the Homeland War. Perhaps it is precisely this paradoxical stance by 
left-liberal academic circles that conceals the secret of the West’s fascination 
with the Yugoslav idea, a fascination which did so much damage to the cre-
ation of the modern, democratic Republic of Croatia and perceptions of its 
Homeland War.
Hobsbawm did not just stop by saying that the Croatian nation emerged as 
an expression of petit-bourgeois aspirations. He went even farther by accept-
ing the views of Mirjana Gross that the Croatian nobility was “a nation without 
‘nationality’,” implying that it could not identify with the people.7 Moreover, 
Hobsbawm acknowledges the Serbs as having proto-national feelings even 
prior to the nineteenth century, but not the Croats, and he even faults Croa-
tian historian Ivo Banac for his “failure to allow for this adequately”.8 In other 
words, Hobsbawm actually wanted to imply that the Croats are an ahistorical 
nation that emerged as a result of a petit-bourgeois ethno-national movement. 
To be sure, he did not only characterize the Croatian national movement in 
these terms. He stated that in 1914 one could find many movements in Europe 
that stressed the linguistic and/or ethnic element, which “existed hardly or 
not at all” in 1870, and he listed the Armenians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Jews 
7 Ibid., 74.
8 Ibid., 76.
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(both Zionist and non-Zionist), Macedonians and Albanians in the Balkans, 
Basques, Catalans, Welsh, Flemings in Belgium, and Ukrainians.9 Hobsbawm 
additionally believed that the Croatian national movement (“nationalism”) 
should not be confused with the early Croatian support for Yugoslav or “Il-
lyrian” nationalism, and he later concluded that “mass Croatian national con-
sciousness appears to have developed only after the establishment of Yugo-
slavia, and against the new kingdom, or more precisely the alleged (sic!, op. 
R.S.) Serb predominance within it”.10 Hobsbawm’s attitudes, although clearly 
displaying a Marxist hue at first glance, actually more substantially reflect the 
typical view of southern and eastern Europe from the standpoint of the great 
Western European powers. In other words, Hobsbawm’s interpretation of na-
tional movements in eastern Europe was much more the vantage point of the 
centre looking out onto the periphery, moreover a (post-)imperial centre to-
ward a (post-)colonial periphery, rather than how he wanted to portray it: as 
civic criticism of ethno-national corporatism.
The Serbian aggression against Croatia in 1991 and the international com-
munity’s response are the best examples of how the great powers could place 
their ideological concept above events on the ground, so the Serbian aggressor 
was given the green light to allegedly save multiethnic Yugoslavia, although 
everything pointed to the fact that it was truly a matter of aggression and oc-
cupation, while the Croatian nation, because of its desire to live in its own 
democratic state, was left to the rapine of aggressor forces because this desire 
was perceived in the West as separatism, ethno-nationalism and chauvinism, 
coupled with the old burden of the fascist legacy and the Marxist view that the 
Croatian nation by its very nature is counter-revolutionary, anti-progressive 
and ahistorical. Or everything happened the way it did because the West does 
not like small ethnic states. And so Serbian aggression against Croatia was 
waged with the support of the Western states, which believed that they were 
thus rescuing the idea of multiculturalism and social progress.
Tuđmans’s original sin
In the equal blame narrative, a special role is played by the personification 
of crimes in the personages of the “nationalistic leaders”. In general, it is known 
that the first Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, was very poorly regarded by 
Western politicians, but also in Western academic circles. State succinctly, he 
was denoted as a nationalist, with the additional stigma of being a historical 
revisionist and an anti-Semite. Those who stand in his defence generally say 
that Tuđman’s sin was actually the general Croatian sin. The Croats wanted 
to leave Yugoslavia, they wanted to live in peace and build their future, but 
9 Ibid., 106.
10 Ibid., 106, 135.
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they did not have the support of the great powers in this.11 However, there are 
several even more important factors in the incrimination of Tuđman’s life and 
work that are rarely considered.
First, Tuđman did not appear as the result of Western policies, that is, he 
did not rise to power as their exponent. No high American officials attended 
his inauguration, such as, for example, when US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright came to the inauguration of Stjepan Mesić in 2000, which irresist-
ibly called to mind a sort of ordination. Tuđman was, thus, a ‘home-grown’ 
Croatian political figure. His assumption of power in Croatia demonstrated 
the absence of political initiatives by the great powers in the territory of the 
SFRY in 1990, or rather the presence of a political vacuum that emerged as a 
consequence of the implosion of the Yugoslav communist nomenklatura.
Second, Tuđman advocated the break-up of Yugoslavia and an indepen-
dent Croatian state, and this was something the West long failed to accept. This 
is demonstrated by Margaret Thatcher’s words quoted above, but even more 
so by the last US ambassador to socialist Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, 
who began his book on the fall of Yugoslavia, Origins of a Catastrophe, with 
these words: “This is a story with villains – villains guilty of destroying the 
multiethnic state of Yugoslavia, of provoking four wars, and of throwing some 
twenty million people into a distress unknown since the Second World War”12 
For Zimmermann, the identity of these villains is not in question. Besides Slo-
bodan Milošević, he designated Franjo Tuđman as the other major guilty party 
with this description: “A fanatic Croatian nationalist, Tuđman hated Yugosla-
via and its multiethnic values. He wanted a Croatian state for Croats, and he 
was unwilling to guarantee equal rights to the 12 percent of Croatia’s citizens 
who were Serbs.”13
Third, during the war, Tuđman fought for Croatian interests, even though 
he was asked to back down many times, i.e., to be more “cooperative”. After the 
occupation of almost a third of Croatia’s territory and the establishment of the 
Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina, Tuđman was subjected to constant 
pressure to accept this as a fait accompli. From the end of 1991 to early 1995, 
it appeared as though Croatia would never manage to restore full sovereignty 
over its occupied territories. Thus, in the spring of 1995 the West even devised 
the so-called “Z4 Plan” which was, stated concisely, unworkable, unjust and 
unsustainable. Under such conditions, many politicians would have accepted 
this status quo. Tuđman instead launched the military/police operation code-
named Storm, opting for yet another high-risk move. Ultimately he succeeded 
11 If it is even possible to compare two historical periods, Tuđman’s position in 1990 may be 
likened to the position of Stjepan Radić, who vainly attempted to internationalize the Croatian 
question in the 1990s.
12 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 1999), viii.
13 Ibid., ix.
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in his aim, returning the entirety of the occupied territories to the full sover-
eignty of the Republic of Croatia, and the success of his policies were even ac-
knowledged by some of the leading international actors who did not otherwise 
hold him in high regard.14
Fourth, Tuđman and Croatia were not earnestly supported by any of the 
great powers. Although there was often talk of the Vatican-German-American 
axis which allegedly stood behind the entire process of Yugoslavia’s collapse 
and Croatia’s independence, actual international relations were quite different. 
The Vatican never had the influence to independently conduct such a diplo-
matic campaign, while Germany, afraid of evoking fears of its Second World 
War legacy, had to tread very carefully on the international stage. Tuđman 
wanted the support of the greatest global power, but the United States only saw 
him as an instrument of its intervention in the Balkans, and never as an ally or 
genuine partner. During the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, Ameri-
can political and academic circles actually still viewed Serbia as the Yugoslav 
Piedmont, which is confirmed by Zimmermann’s statements cited above. Nev-
ertheless, during the wartime years, Tuđman imposed himself as the main 
force who could resolve the conflict. In 1995, Operation Storm quashed Ser-
bian designs in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, forcing Milošević to the 
negotiating table, which in turn led to the acceptance of the Dayton Accords. 
Croatia thus secured its continued existence, because it proved itself on the 
global political scene as a factor of stability. It plays this role in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia even today, and became a member of the European 
Union and NATO as a result.
Tuđman remained in the West’s poor graces until his death in 1999. Deci-
sions made by Western countries were supposed to eliminate him from po-
litical life on two occasions. The first such decree was already issued in 1991: 
the arms embargo which the United Nations Security Council imposed on 
25 September 1991. Even though the Security Council’s decision stipulated a 
ban on delivery of all types of weapons and military equipment into Yugosla-
via, it was clear at the time – at the beginning of the aggression by Serbia and 
the Yugoslav People’s Army against Croatia – that this embargo only harmed 
Croatia, because the Serbian side held the former Yugoslavia’s complete arma-
ments in its hands. This was therefore a death sentence against Croatia and 
certainly a move aimed at either eliminating Tuđman or making him an out-
law at the very least. Croatia did not surrender at the time, rather it continued 
to arm itself via the black market, and this method remains as an argument for 
the incrimination of Franjo Tuđman to this day. The second condemnation of 
Tuđman should have been accomplished by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), also established by the UN Security 
14 David Owen wrote about this unambiguously: “The victors in the Yugoslav wars of 1991-5 
have been the Croats and President Tuđman” David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1995), 353.
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Council in 1993. As historians with academic freedom, cognizant of the free-
dom of speech as the foundation of democracy, we could also speak of the va-
lidity of Tribunal’s judgments in various cases. However, for historical research 
into the stance of the international community toward the Homeland War, 
it is much more vital to analyze the work of the ICTY’s Prosecution, and to 
ascertain the indictments raised by the Prosecution and against whom. There 
can be no doubt that the ICTY Prosecution had a specific general vision of the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts, and one precept 
in its work was very clearly expressed: the idea on the equal culpability of all 
sides, mostly the Serbian and Croatian. In line with this precept, the political 
leadership of the Croats and Serbs – and of the Bosniaks only to a smaller 
extent – had to be convicted. The judgment against several Croatian generals, 
Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač and Ante Gotovina, for war crimes perpetrated 
during Operation Storm was supposed to be crucial for events in Croatia. The 
Prosecution compiled the indictment such that it practically incriminated the 
entire military campaign, as well as the entire military and political leadership 
of the Republic of Croatia headed by Franjo Tuđman. Nonetheless, on 16 No-
vember 2012, the trial chamber presided over by Judge Theodore Meron did 
not accept the Prosecution’s arguments and the indictment failed, and Markač 
and Gotovina were released from custody.15 Sonja Biserko, the president of 
the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, spoke about all of these 
matters quite openly at the time. She said the after the acquittal of Markač 
and Gotovina, Serbia had to accept responsibility for starting the war and the 
aggression against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the in-
dictment against Generals Gotovina and Markač was politically motivated in 
order to strike a balance (sic!, R. S.) with the indictment against Ratko Mladić 
and Radovan Karadžić. Biserko backed her view of the politicized nature of 
the indictment by adding that “it is very odd that Gotovina and Markač were 
sentenced to 24 and 18 years in prison in the non-binding first-instance judg-
ment, but are now free,” and ultimately concluded that “this means that the 
Prosecution was politically motivated in this case”.16
Drivers of the equal blame narrative
Specifying the names of the primary drivers of the narrative on equal his-
torical blame is quite challenging, for the number of works and monographs 
on the collapse of the SFRY number in the hundreds. When analyzing the cre-
ation of the equal blame narrative, the most intriguing task is to determine the 
members of Western academic communities who most influenced the forma-
tion of the views of Western politicians. An analysis of the memoirs of Warren 
15 General Ivan Čermak was acquitted already in the first instance judgment of 15 April 2011.
16 “Predsjednica srpskog Helsinškog odbora: Srbija mora prihvatiti odgovornost za početak 
rata u Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj, Bosni!”, Jutarnji list, 16 November 2012.
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Zimmermann, David Owen, Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright, per-
haps the four best known international participants in the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, shows that during the crisis and armed conflicts these politicians 
were actually rather poorly acquainted with the history of South East Europe, 
so it is therefore unsurprising that prejudices played a major role in their activ-
ities. The latter included the already mentioned prejudices of the West vis-à-vis 
the East, wherein the West means Western Europe and the United States, and 
the East means of the countries of Eastern Europe which had freed themselves 
of communism in the 1990s. Actually, the participation of the academic com-
munity in the debate surrounding the causes of the collapse of the SFRY and 
the wars waged from 1991 to 1995 was surprisingly scant. In their consider-
ation of Yugoslavia’s collapse, most of the media, but also politicians, made use 
of the works of journalists, such as Robert Kaplan, Tim Judah, Marcus Tanner, 
Misha Glenny, Allan Little and Laura Silber, Mark Almond and others. It is 
not only peculiar that the primary analysts of communist Yugoslavia’s collapse 
were journalists, but also that the level of discourse conducted among them 
was quite low and surprisingly non-academic, i.e., it was limited to mutual ac-
cusations of supporting Serbian or Bosniak policies. It is similarly fascinating 
that almost none of the more distinguished current affairs writers or scholars 
in the US and Europe were accused of advocating the Croatian side, because 
(it would appear) none such existed.
Some of the aforementioned politicians testified to the influence of these 
journalists. For example, in his memoir To End a War, Richard Holbrooke 
wrote that Robert Kaplan had considerable influence on the American public 
at the onset of the war, and even on President Bill Clinton himself.17 Nonethe-
less, the entire series of individuals Holbrooke thanks in in his acknowledge-
ments for their help in writing the book does not contain a single historian. 
It is also interesting that the persons mentioned from the former Yugoslavia 
include two Bosniak politicians, Ejup Ganić and Haris Silajdžić. Since Silajdžić 
is a historian by profession, it may be concluded that this is the only person 
from academic historical circles who had any influence on Holbrooke’s de-
cisions.18 However, Holbrooke’s book is worthwhile due to one other detail. 
Holbrooke felt the need to discuss the book Black Lamb and Grey Falcon by 
British writer Rebecca West. The fate of this book during the period when Yu-
goslavia broke apart is an interesting subject for a separate scholarly study. It 
was originally written in 1941, but it was re-issued on the eve of the outbreak 
of armed conflict in the 1990s. Those who read this work with admiration and 
reverence included the already mentioned journalist Robert Kaplan, so it was 
very likely that he was the key individual who revived interest in this book in 
the 1990s, which is why it became mandatory reading for all Westerners who 
wanted to become involved with the crisis in Yugoslavia. Holbrooke, however, 
17 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 23.
18 Ibid., 37.-375.
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had an entirely different impression of this book, so different that he in fact 
dedicated a chapter to it at the beginning of his memoir called “Bad History, or 
The Rebecca West Factor”.19 Moreover, Holbrooke openly wrote, “According to 
numerous press reports, the book had a profound impact on President Clinton 
and other members of the Administration shortly after they came into office”.20 
This statement, considered in the context of research into the creation of the 
dominant narrative on equal blame, is quite important, as it demonstrates that 
at crucial moments in the crisis in Yugoslavia, US policy at the highest level 
was influenced by the writings of a single journalist and a book from 1941.
Holbrooke actually went on to describe how the idea of ancient ethnic 
conflicts inherent in the Balkans and the very mentality of its various peoples 
created a stance in the US that nothing could be done. Among the individu-
als responsible for such policies, he particularly underscored the influence of 
Lawrence Eagleburger, a former US ambassador to Yugoslavia who in 1992 be-
came the US secretary of state. In September 1992, Eagleburger described his 
own stance – also the stance of the Bush administration – thusly: “I have said 
this 38,000 times, and I have to say this to the people of this country as well. 
This tragedy is not something that can be settled from outside and it’s about 
damn well time that everybody understood that. Until the Bosnians, Serbs and 
Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world 
can do about it”.21 A similar stance by American and European diplomats was 
described by Madeleine Albright as well: “Initially, the crisis was viewed by the 
Europeans and the senior Bush administration alike as a European problem 
that could and should be settled by Europeans. Diplomats from the continent 
anxiously shuttled back and forth arranging cease-fires that did not stick and 
predicting an end to the violence that did not come. These efforts were under-
cut the by the theory—widespread in Europe—that Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks 
were so intent on killing each other that it was pointless to try to stop them”.22
However, near the end of the war, works from the academic community ap-
peared as a counterpoint to the superficial, sensationalist and generally biased 
articles written by journalists and current affairs writers, and they explained 
Yugoslavia’s collapse and the outbreak of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Her-
zegovina with well-backed arguments. Among these academically-trained in-
dividuals, certainly the most influential was Noel Malcolm, who published his 
19 In this chapter, Holbrooke also criticizes Kaplan’s views: “West’s openly pro-Serb attitudes 
and her view that the Muslims were racially inferior had influenced two generations of readers 
and policy makers. Some of her other themes were revisited in modern dress in Robert Kaplan’s 
widely acclaimed 1993 best-seller, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, which left most 
of its readers with the sense that nothing could be done by outsiders in a region so steeped in 
ancient hatreds”. Ibid., 22.
20 Ibid., 22.
21 Ibid., 23.
22 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 179-180.
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book Bosnia: A Short History in 1994. Malcolm was one of the rare historians 
who can be found cited in the memoirs of the aforementioned participants in 
political events; specifically, he was praised by both Holbrooke and Thatch-
er.23 Besides Malcolm, Thatcher also made use of the book by Norman Cigar, 
Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (1995).24 The others from the 
political quintet analysed herein (Zimmermann, Thatcher, Holbrooke, Owen 
and Albright) did not cite anyone from academic circles whose expertise was 
worth mention.
Historians thus began to appear in public as experts to a much lesser de-
gree than journalists and current affairs writers, practically at the end of the 
war. Besides Noel Malcolm and Norman Cigar, the better known Western ex-
perts on the former Yugoslavia included John Lampe, Sabrina P. Ramet, Rob-
ert M. Hayden, Mark Thompson and Holm Sundhausen, who were known, 
but their influence on the public and policies in the West in comparison to 
the aforementioned journalists in the 1990s was considerably smaller. Over 
the past several years, the Western historians who did the most to shed light 
on the collapse of communist Yugoslavia were Charles Ingrao and Sabrina P. 
Ramet. They deserve praise for including historians from Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia in the academic discourse on these events. It is par-
ticularly noteworthy that Charles Ingrao launched a major project called the 
Scholars’ Initiative (2001-2009) with the aim of researching the collapse of the 
SFRY. This project encompassed dozens of scholars from the US and Europe, 
among them numerous Croatian, Bosniak and Serbian historians. However, 
these efforts by Ingrao and Ramet to take a balanced stance on this problem, 
to include all views, necessarily led to a conclusion that pointed to the theory 
of equal blame.
Conclusion
The thesis on equal blame imposed by Western academic circles as the 
dominant narrative on the war in Croatia is actually rooted in the stance that 
this interpretation of the Homeland War is the best foundation for reconcilia-
tion and reintegration of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, so it is appar-
ent that it has a clear political purpose. All of this points to the conclusion that 
the standpoints of Western historiography may be understood only if viewed 
within the framework of the general policies concerning the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia implemented by the United States and the European Union.
What comes out of an analysis of the memoirs of certain major representa-
tives of Western countries (the US and EU member states) who participated in 
settling the crisis and halting the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
23 R. Holbrooke, To End a War, 23; M. Thatcher, Statecraft, 300.
24 Ibid., 300.
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that their views were mostly influenced by current affairs writers and journal-
ists, and only by the academic community to an astoundingly small extent. The 
influence of Croatian historians and historians from the former Yugoslavia in 
general was virtually non-existent. It would therefore appear that in the West, 
the views of the academic community cleaved to the views of the political 
sphere and the media, even though one would expect that the situation would 
be just the opposite in developed Western countries.
The equal blame thesis is topical to this day. It can only seem a just and 
sound approach by misinformed Western politicians and intellectuals. How-
ever, the post-Dayton peace demonstrates the numerous problems which 
have ensued precisely from the fact that Serbia was never unambiguously 
proclaimed the aggressor in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the end, one 
must agree with George Orwell: who controls the present controls the past, 
and who controls the past controls the future. The West has the power to im-
pose whatever historical narrative on Yugoslavia’s collapse that it wishes. It is 
precisely for this reason that the great Western powers have a responsibility to 
the Yugoslav successor states, and this is why they must rise above the preju-
dices that often bind their elites.
Große wissenschaftliche Autoritäten und kleine Nationen: die 
Bildung der historischen Narrative über Franjo Tuđman und den 
Kroatienkrieg (kroatisch: Heimatskrieg)
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag werden die Ursachen des Entstehens des Narrativs der 
geteilten Schuld und die Gründe dafür, dass dieses Narrativ dominant in west-
lichen Historiographien wurde, erforscht. Der Autor analysiert die Perspektive, 
aus der westeuropäische und amerikanische Politik und akademische Gemein-
schaft den Zerfall der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien und die 
Rolle Kroatiens zwischen 1990 und 1995 betrachten. Autoren aus Europa und 
Amerika, außer gewissen Ausnahmen, vertreten die Meinung, dass der Krieg 
auf dem Gebiet Jugoslawiens ein Bürgerkrieg war. Beharren darauf, dass die-
sem Krieg der Charakter des Bürgerkriegs immanent war, hat auch den Zweck, 
die geteilte Verantwortung der Konfliktseiten – der kroatischen und der serbi-
schen – für den Kriegsausbruch zu beweisen. Das Narrativ der geteilten Schuld 
entstand einerseits als die Folge der pragmatischen Politik des Westens gegen-
über dem Gebiet des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens und andererseits wegen zahl-
reicher Stereotype über dieses Gebiet, die in westlichen Historiographien seit 
R. SKENDEROVIĆ , Great Scholarly Authorities and Small Nations – the Formation of Historical...
136
Jahrzehnten existieren. Obwohl einige einflussreiche Einzelne, beispielsweise 
Margaret Thatcher, darauf aufmerksam machten, dass dieser Zutritt umstritten 
war, blieb er doch auch weiterhin dominant. Das Narrativ der geteilten Schuld 
hat seinen Ursprung einerseits in politischen Interessen und Vorurteilen, ande-
rerseits aber auch in der allgemein verbreiteten Auffassung der westlichen po-
litischen und akademischen Kreise, dass Jugoslawien den idealen Rahmen für 
das politische Leben der südslawischen Völker darstellte. Die genannten Kreise 
betrachteten deswegen den Zerfall Jugoslawiens 1991-1995 nur als einen Kon-
flikt zwischen den Mächten, die für die Erhaltung des multiethnischen Jugo-
slawiens kämpften, und den Separatisten, bzw. den Nationalisten, die von dem 
„rückschrittlichen“, nach der Gründung ethnischer Staaten strebenden Geiste 
geführt wurden. Sogar nachdem dem Ausbruch des Kriegs in Bosnien und Her-
zegowina (1992-1995) behielten die westlichen Staaten und ihre akademischen 
Gemeinschaften die Auffassung, dass es zum Zerfall dieses Staates keinesfalls 
kommen darf (obwohl er laut dem Abkommen von Dayton eigentlich geteilt 
war), weil dieser Staat, nach der Meinung des Westens, die letzte Chance für 
die Erhaltung des Zusammenlebens und der Multiethnizität darstellte, ja sogar 
auch den potenziellen Kern eines neuen Jugoslawiens (des Westbalkans, oder 
der Jugosphäre). Der Einfluss des Narrativs der geteilten Schuld kam besonders 
deutlich in der Arbeit der Anklagebehörde des Internationalen Strafgerichtes 
für das ehemalige Jugoslawien (ICTY) zum Ausdruck.
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